I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, States have concluded over 2,500 bilateral investment treaties and numerous multilateral agreements to facilitate foreign investment. 1 According to an almost universal consensus, foreign investments benefit host States by stimulating greater competition, generating an influx of capital, technology, and managerial skills, and creating new jobs. 2 Foreign investors also benefit from access to new markets, a cheaper workforce, and natural resources. 3 Nearly all investment treaties provide for arbitration to resolve disputes. 4 The system of investor-state dispute resolution endows private persons-either individuals or corporations-with the capacity to submit a claim against a State without the intervention of their respective national governments. 5 Rather than forcing investors to rely either on domestic courts or on State-to-State political negotiations, international investment treaties provide investors with a right to initiate dispute settlements directly against the host State in a neutral forum. 6 Under these treaties, investors can typically choose to submit a dispute to ICSID or to an ad hoc tribunal established under the rules of UNCITRAL. 7 Treaties may also provide for dispute resolution procedures of other institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the London Court of International Arbitration. 8 Because investment treaties are primarily intended to encourage foreign investment, they are usually silent on the rights of States vis-à-vis investors and obligations of investors vis-à-vis States. 9 The States' right to counterclaim seeks to counterbalance this asymmetry-counterclaims facilitate equality of the parties and, rendered in a single forum, make investor-state dispute resolution more efficient.
Hardwired into the very structure of investment treaties therefore, is an apparent asymmetry between the rights of investors and the obligations of States. 10 Counterclaims, however, remain relatively rare and tribunals are often reluctant to allow them. It has been suggested that States rarely bring counterclaims because of their counsels' failure to advise them on this matter. 11 Indeed, State counterclaims present a number of particular legal problems: express investor consent to counterclaims or their obligations are absent in treaties, and the nature of the investor-state dispute resolution system is primarily tailored to protect investor interests. 12 This Article suggests that such constraints should not be fatal to a State's right to assert counterclaims against foreign investors. The right to counterclaim is a procedural right customary to all major arbitration rules, including those used 12. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Arbitration, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 169 (2011) (discussing how undercapitalized local subsidiaries often appear as claimants in arbitral proceedings, and complicate the prospect of obtaining and enforcing arbitral awards against properly capitalized parent companies).
by ICSID or UNCITRAL tribunals. 13 Although investment treaties are typically concluded in the interest of investors, they usually provide for broad jurisdiction over disputes concerning an investment and do not restrict the parties' obligations to only those contained in the investment treaties.
14 Obligations of investors arise not from the express language of treaties, but out of applicable law, stipulated either in the investment treaty, arbitration agreement or determined by the investor-state tribunal. 15 This Article demonstrates that investor obligations may arise under sources of international law other than investment treaties, such as general principles of law. 16 Secondary sources of international law such as case law and scholarly writings also serve as evidence of international law rules applicable to investors. 17 Under certain circumstances, relevant investor obligations can also be found in investment contracts with States. 18 The next part of this Article provides an overview of counterclaims, which States asserted under the rules of IUSCT, ICSID, and UNCITRAL. Part III sets forth the main problems related to the requirement of investor consent to counterclaims. Finally, Part IV demonstrates that substantive obligations of investors can be found in sources of international law other than investment treaties, and with certain limitations, in investor-state contracts. The IUSCT case law suggests that jurisdiction over a counterclaim depends entirely on the presence of jurisdiction over the claim. 36 If jurisdiction over the claim fails, related counterclaims should also be dismissed. 37 If, however, the tribunal asserts its jurisdiction over the counterclaim, it can stand alone, even if the main claim has been withdrawn. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre.
Article 46 of the ICSID Convention stipulates: 43 The ICSID Convention's drafting history suggests that the reason for the inclusion of counterclaims in the Convention was to eliminate the necessity of separate proceedings. 44 The drafters emphasized that counterclaims should be covered by consent of the parties and should not go beyond the tribunal's competence. 45 According to the Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank, the Convention is meant to be equally adapted to the requirements of the institution of proceedings brought by investors as well as by host States. set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over it.
55
The requirement that a dispute should arise out of the same contract was completely inappropriate in the context of investor-state disputes.
56
As this review of major arbitration rules suggests, investorstate tribunals can assert jurisdiction over counterclaims. There is, however, a legitimate question of whether investors consent to such counterclaims, because most investment treaties do not provide for any obligations of foreign investors and are generally concluded for the benefit of foreign investors who usually initiate arbitral proceedings.
More counterclaims are likely to be asserted by States now that the rules have been revised.
III. CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS

A. INVESTOR CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS
Historically, the main aim of investment treaties and contracts was to moderate the exercise of sovereign power by host States. 57 Only States have a monopoly on using force to regulate activities of all economic actors in their own territory. The idea behind investment treaties is that it is the conduct of States, rather than the conduct of investors, which needs to be kept in check. 58 Today most treaties explicitly provide that their main goal is to protect investors and facilitate foreign investments. 59 Investors are privileged and "traditionally [ have rights but not obligations. 61 Treaties typically only enable the investor, rather than the State, to submit claims to arbitration.
62 Investment treaties typically neither provide for the submission of a State's counterclaims nor even mention the right of an investor to submit counter-claims. 63 Some scholars even dub investment arbitration as an international " 'quasijudicial review' of national regulatory action." 64 Like all international treaties, investment treaties are supposed to be interpreted in light of their object and purpose. 65 In the absence of any specific language providing for a possibility of counterclaims against foreign investors, allowing such counterclaims may seem problematic. Consent remains a cornerstone of the system of international adjudication in general 66 and investor-state arbitration in particular.
67
If the investor limited its acceptance of jurisdiction to claims based on the treaty, should only the treaty be the source of rights and obligations in a particular dispute? To answer this question, it is important to understand that the investment treaty itself is not the basis for the tribunal's jurisdiction. Investors are not parties to international treaties, and therefore, cannot consent to arbitration in such treaties.
When a State enters into an investment treaty, it offers eligible investors a right to arbitrate any relevant investment disputes through international arbitration. agreement to arbitrate the investment dispute. 69 An investor's consent to arbitration can also be manifested in a separate agreement with the State to arbitrate a claim under the investment treaty.
70
Such consent typically incorporates by reference a certain set of arbitration rules, which the parties agree to apply in full. Neither such agreements nor requests for arbitration usually contain an express reference to counterclaims. 71 But narrow wording of acceptance of the offer to arbitrate disputes should not have the effect of excluding State counterclaims because [a] BIT is not an á la carte selection of provisions among which the investor can chose.
72 If the arbitration rules include the procedural right to submit counterclaims, 73 the parties are bound by it. The State relied on Article 10 of the SCC rules and asserted a counterclaim for non-material injury to its reputation.
78
. . . the jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal over a State Party counterclaim under an investment treaty depends upon the terms of the dispute resolution provision of the treaty, the nature of the counterclaim and the relationship of the counterclaims with the claims in arbitration.
The tribunal ruled that counterclaims were outside of its jurisdiction because the State failed to specify the basis for its counterclaim in applicable law: 79 The tribunal in that case decided it could not go beyond its subject matter jurisdiction and declined to assert jurisdiction over the counterclaim. 80 Had the ECT covered a wider category of disputes or provided for investor obligations, the outcome could have been different. 81 The ICSID tribunal in Roussalis v. Romania recently rejected respondent's counterclaim on the basis of an absence of the investor's consent. 82 The tribunal focused on the dispute resolution clause of the BIT, which provided for resolution of disputes concerning obligations of the State. 83 The majority in that case reasoned that the relevant BIT language which refers to "disputes . . . concerning an obligation of the latter" limited jurisdiction to claims brought by investors about obligations of the host State. The language of Article 8, in referring to 'All disputes,' is wide enough to include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, so long, of course, as other relevant requirements are also met.
The tribunal explained: 92 This analysis of case law suggests that if the relevant dispute resolution treaty provision is broad enough and is not limited to obligations specifically provided by the treaty, the tribunals are more likely to assert counterclaims against investors. But as explained below, even in the context of broadly formulated dispute resolution clauses, not all investor obligations fall under the subject matter jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals. Morocco was a subsidiary that had not been fully formed at the time the agreement was made, but that the tribunal still recognized its jurisdiction over the claim); see also Kryvoi, supra note 12, at 184-86.
95. See, e.g., Kryvoi, supra note 12, at 171-73 (explaining that limited liability is one of the main rationales behind the corporate form and that creating subsidiary companies can further shield business owners from risk).
against them.
96 It may be difficult, if at all possible, to make a parent company with deeper pockets a party to arbitral proceedings.
97
When a State-affiliated entity signs a contract, investors can extend the clause to the State as a whole. The International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility explain when an entity is considered to be acting with the authority of the State.
An entity whose structure, function, and control flows from governmental authority, as well as the conduct of persons empowered by the State to "exercise elements of the governmental authority," is considered to be acting with the authority of the State "provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance." It is more difficult for States to counterclaim against corporations that have not signed the arbitration agreement. This is yet another manifestation of the pro-investor asymmetry of investor-state arbitration. 99 The tribunal asserted its jurisdiction and permitted the State to assert a counterclaim that involved a locally incorporated subsidiary, SOCAME. 100. See id. at 15-16 (noting that the subsidiary SOCAME was under foreign control at the time the agreements were signed between the parties, which brought it under the arbitration agreement). SOCAME, which stipulated that ICSID arbitration would be used in the event of disputes.
101
When the issue of counterclaims against a locally incorporated company arose, the arbitrators focused on subject matter jurisdiction over the contract to ultimately allow the counterclaims to move forward, instead of focusing on ICSID's personal jurisdiction over a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement.
102
The Klöckner tribunal explained that the main question was not whether the tribunal had jurisdiction "ratione personae" over the locally incorporated company, 103 but rather whether it had jurisdiction "ratione materiae" on the application and interpretation of the Establishment Agreement. 104 The tribunal concluded that the contracts entered into by a local subsidiary establish the jurisdiction of the tribunal with respect to the counterclaim because there was a direct connection between the contracts and the parties' claims.
105
In Saluka v. Czech Republic, a UNCITRAL case, the investor contended that the tribunal had no personal jurisdiction over the entity against which the State asserted a counterclaim because that entity had never consented to be a party to the arbitration. 106 The State responded that if the locally incorporated entity was permitted to represent the interests of the foreign parent company in arbitration, a counterclaim could be asserted against the foreign parent company.
107
101. See id. at 13-18 (detailing the different agreements signed between the companies and Cameroon, and the resulting disputes).
The State asked to pierce the corporate veil and treat both companies as "the same single group of companies" 102. Id. at 17 ("The question before the present Tribunal is . . . to determine whether it has jurisdiction 'ratione materiae' to rule on the application and interpretation of the Establishment Agreement.").
103. See id. (explaining that the foreign company was acting through the local company, meaning that the contract was actually between the foreign company and the host country, Cameroon The Saluka tribunal refrained from ruling on the issue of piercing the corporate veil and merely assumed that 109 The tribunal ultimately held that it did not have jurisdiction for two reasons: first, because there was an absence of a close connection between the primary claim and the counterclaim; 110 and second, because the contract established a special dispute resolution procedure for the issues contested in the counterclaim.
111
It appears that tribunals are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in the counterclaim context because counterclaims may fall outside of the parties' consent to arbitration. Even if a tribunal decides to assert jurisdiction over affiliated companies, the party enforcing the resulting award may face serious challenges. 112 Enforcing awards against parent companies located in other countries in the absence of their explicit consent to arbitration requires piercing the corporate veil, which can be problematic under applicable arbitration rules, relevant domestic law, and the New York Convention. 113 The only exception is an award granted under the ICSID Convention. Such award should be enforced as if it is a final judgment of a domestic court of that State. 112. See, e.g., Kryvoi, supra note 12, 175-77 (explaining the different legal grounds on which an affiliated company party may assert in order to challenge an arbitration award).
113. Id. 114. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.1 ("A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal
The next section analyzes in more detail whether foreign investors have not only rights but also international obligations vis-à-vis host States.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS OF INVESTORS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES A. INVESTORS AS BEARERS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
According to the traditional doctrine of international law, only States, not individuals, can be the subjects of obligation and responsibility in international law. 115 Until the second half of the Twentieth century, the dominant principle of international law was that a wrong done to a national of one State, for which another State was intentionally responsible, was not actionable by the injured national, but instead was only actionable by his State. 116 Investors were not able to proceed with an international claim against a foreign government directly.
117
In the past, foreign investors had to seek the diplomatic protection of their home State to support their case and to initiate proceedings before an international tribunal. 118 In recent years, the legal status of investors in international law has been shifting from this classical position to the recognition of an increased role of individual rights. 119 courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.").
115 133. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 42.1. 134. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, rule 35.1 (stipulating that the tribunal must apply the law that is chosen by the parties, but also noting that if the parties fail to identify which law should apply, the tribunal will elect the applicable law for them). the investor's obligations. 135 In the 2006 case, Inceysa v. El Salvador, the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis of an investment treaty provision that the investment must be made in accordance with the laws of the host country. 136 The tribunal held that an investment made through fraudulent means could not be made in accordance with law.
137
Although applicable domestic law contemplates investor obligations, not all domestic law obligations rise to the level of international law obligations. Counterclaims arising out of the application of domestic law of general applicability usually fall outside of the international tribunals' jurisdictions.
For instance, in a number of cases before the IUSCT, Iran counterclaimed requesting allegedly unpaid taxes and social security contributions. 138 The IUSCT tribunals usually held that such counterclaims arise not out of the contracts that were the subject matter of the investor's claim, but out of the generally applicable domestic law. 139 This approach remained the same even if the contract upon which a claim was based expressly allocated the burden to comply with such domestic law requirements to the claimant.
140
A good example of an ICSID case with the same logic is Amco v. Indonesia, in which the State asserted a counterclaim seeking payment of taxes and customs duties. 141 Subsequently, Indonesia modified its counterclaim and alleged tax fraud. The tribunal eventually ruled that because the claim did not arise "directly out of an investment," as required by the ICSID Convention, the tax fraud case was outside its jurisdiction.
143
[I]t is correct to distinguish between rights and obligations that are applicable to legal or natural persons who are within the reach of a host State's jurisdiction, as a matter of general law; and rights and obligations that are applicable to an investor as a consequence of an investment agreement entered into with that host State.
The tribunal also distinguished between rights and obligations provided by the investment treaty and generally applicable rights and obligations:
Legal disputes relating to the latter will fall under Article 25(1) of the Convention. Legal disputes concerning the former, in principle, are to be decided by the appropriate procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless the general law generates an investment dispute under the Convention.
144
The same logic on arbitrability of domestic law claims in investor-state arbitration appeared in Saluka v. Czech Republic, a dispute governed by UNCITRAL rules. 145 Like in Amco v. Indonesia, the tribunal emphasized that the counterclaims involved "non-compliance with the general law of the Czech Republic" and "rights and obligations which are applicable, as a matter of the general law of the Czech Republic, to persons subject to the Czech Republic's jurisdiction." 146 The tribunal concluded that the counterclaims were to be decided not through the investment treaty settlement procedure, but through appropriate procedures under Czech law.
147
More recently, a UNCITRAL tribunal was asked to decide a tax counterclaim in Paushok v. Mongolia. 148 The tribunal ruled the claim was outside its jurisdiction because the claim arose out of the public law of Mongolia. extend the extraterritorial application and enforcement of its public laws, and in particular its tax laws, to individuals or entities not subject to and not having accepted to submit to Mongolian public law or its courts. Thus, if the Arbitral Tribunal extended its jurisdiction to the Counterclaims, it would be acquiescing to a possible exorbitant extension of Mongolia's legislative jurisdiction without any legal basis under international law to do so, since the generally accepted principle is the nonextraterritorial enforceability of national public laws and, specifically, of national tax laws.
150
General measures such as tax or economic policy are normally outside the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals as long as they do not result in a violation of prior international law commitments.
151 But if such measures have a specific effect on the violation of preexisting commitments, they may fall under the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.
152
In summary, counterclaims can be based on domestic law obligations of investors only if those same obligations were specifically mentioned in the relevant investment treaty or otherwise committed to by the parties. Violation of purely domestic law obligations is usually insufficient for an investorstate tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over counterclaims.
C. CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS
Most investor-state disputes involve one or more contracts concluded between the foreign investor and the State. That could be a privatization contract, a concession contract, a license agreement, or other types of contract. Unlike investment treaties, these contracts also include concrete investor obligations in addition to obligations of States. It is important to understand whether obligations of investors arising out of contracts can fall under the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals. UNCITRAL and ICC arbitration rules provide that contract provisions should be taken into account when tribunals resolve disputes. 153 The reason why most arbitration rules explicitly cover contractual obligations is that those rules were originally developed for resolution of purely contractual disputes between private parties. Even the ICSID Convention was adopted primarily with contractual disputes in mindwhen the Convention was finalized in 1965, there were almost no investment treaties. 154 On the other hand, nothing in Article 46 of the ICSID Convention implies that its purpose was only to encompass contractual disputes and to exclude investment treaty arbitrations.
155
But it would be wrong to conclude that any obligations in contracts concluded between the foreign investor and the host State automatically rise to the level of being arbitrable by investor-state tribunals. As James Crawford suggested, contractual jurisdiction can be invoked under any sufficiently broad investment treaty dispute resolution clause as long as three conditions are met.
156 First, the contract should relate to an investment rather than being an ordinary contract for the supply of goods or services.
157 Second, the contract should be with the State itself and not with a separate legal entity controlled by the State or a third party.
158 Third, the contract with the State should not have its own dispute resolution clause.
159
The same logic applies to counterclaims. States can assert counterclaims arising out of investor contractual obligations if there is a sufficiently broad investment treaty clause, and the investment contract with the State does not have its own dispute resolution mechanism. 
Czech
Republic tribunal rejected jurisdiction over counterclaims arising from the Share Purchase Agreement because the agreement contained a separate dispute resolution clause. 161 Subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals widens when treaty provisions guarantee the host State's observance of all obligations or commitments entered into vis-à-vis foreign investors. These provisions are commonly known as umbrella clauses.
162 Umbrella clauses are often referred to as pacta sunt servanda clauses because their purpose is to ensure that contracts are respected. 163 A typical umbrella clause provides that: "Each party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments." 164 According to Elihu Lauterpacht, the effect of umbrella clauses is to "put [investorstate contracts] on a special plane in that breach of them becomes immediately a breach of convention." 165 The precise nature and effect of umbrella clauses is uncertain. Some commentators interpret them as protecting "the investor's contractual rights against any interference which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or by administrative or legislative acts." 166 The application of this principle, however, does not explain whether umbrella clauses also cover purely commercial contracts. Article 38(1) provides a classical definition of sources of international law:
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
179
It is important to understand that parties in ICJ proceedings for which the ICJ Statute had been adopted are sovereign States.
180
According to international law theory, self-contained regimes are interrelated wholes of primary and secondary rules that cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be covered under general law. 182 A self-contained regime (lex specialis) provides interpretative guidance that in some ways deviates from the rules of general law (lex generalis).
183
As the Iran-US Claims Tribunal explained in Amoco v Iran:
As a lex specialis in relations between the two countries, the Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary international law . . . however . . . the rules of customary international law may be useful in order to fill in possible lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and implementation of its provisions.
184
In the past, investor-state tribunals applied treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law in addition to investment treaties to determine the obligations of the parties. As the analysis below suggests, not all of these sources of international law help determine investor obligations.
International conventions, and in particular investment treaties, are the first and foremost source of international law applied by investor-state tribunals. In addition to investment treaties, multilateral treaties such as NAFTA and ECT contain provisions for arbitration of investor-state disputes.
186 They provide specific rights of foreign investors such as protection against expropriation and the right to fair and equitable treatment.
187
It is not surprising that while treaties provide for investor rights, investor obligations are not there. Investors cannot be parties to international treaties concluded by States. Can treaties, in principle, impose obligations on investors who are not parties to them? If treaties were treated as regular contracts, then no obligations could be imposed on third parties, only rights. According to a universally accepted principle of contract law, a third party cannot be subjected to a burden by a contract to which it is not a party.
188
A number of developing countries advocate for inclusion of investor obligations directly in international investment agreements. In 2002, China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe proposed that discussions on a multilateral framework on trade and investment also look at legally binding measures aimed at ensuring corporate responsibility and accountability relating to foreign investors. 189 In particular, they insisted on the need to comply with all domestic laws and regulations in all aspects of the economic and social lives of the host States in their activities. 190 Investors, however, are already required to abide by domestic laws of the State in which they operate. This is a consequence not only of domestic law requirements, but also of the international law principle of territorial sovereignty. 191 The host State, as a sovereign actor, can react to investor misconduct by unilaterally imposing sanctions and enforcing them against the assets of the investment project.
192 This is a power the host State already possesses and that the foreign investor lacks. 193 Because investment and other treaties usually do not provide for specific investor obligations, such obligations should be looked for in other primary and secondary sources of international law such as international custom and general principles of law.
c. International Custom
If investor obligations are not set out in relevant treaties, or if their provisions are not sufficiently complete, the tribunal may refer to international custom unless the treaty refers to the application of different law (for example, domestic law).
196
For instance, in ADC v. Hungary, the tribunal first applied the relevant investment treaty and then explained that consent to arbitration must also be deemed to comprise a choice for general international law, including customary international law, if and to the extent that it comes into play for interpreting and applying the provisions of the Treaty.
197
According to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, international custom constitutes "evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 198 The definition includes two basic elements-the actual behavior of States, and the psychological or subjective belief that such behavior is law.
199
The ICSID Convention drafters discussed a number of rules of customary international law. These rules included the obligation to act in good faith,
200
ASEAN Investment Area, art. 13 (Oct. 7, 1998) (allowing Member States to undertake any measures necessary to protect national security, public morals, the prevention of fraud or deceptive practices, and to ensure compliance with their tax obligations in the host jurisdiction). The ICSID Convention, however, mentions none of these principles. Moreover, it is difficult to apply these principles to investor conduct because they deal primarily with conduct of States rather than private parties such as investors. 206 (for example, prohibition of genocide, slavery), affect obligations of investors? That would be problematic because only States (and individuals under certain circumstances), but not corporations, are responsible under international law for violations of such norms. 207 Moreover, corporate criminal liability generally exists neither in international law nor in the majority of domestic legal systems. 208 The main problem in applying customary international law is that it develops as a result of interaction between States and is meant to create obligations for States, 209 INVESTMENT 210 as the jurisprudence of the IUSCT and ICSID cases demonstrates. General principles of law can come from comparative municipal law, the lex mercatoria, and public international law.
211
Choosing domestic law as applicable does not make general principles of law irrelevant. The sole arbitrator in a non-ICSID investor-state dispute in Texaco v. Libya explained the relevance of general principles of law when domestic Libyan law was chosen as applicable. The arbitrator provided that:
[T]he application of the principles of Libyan [domestic] law does not have the effect of ruling out the application of the principles of international law, but quite the contrary: it simply requires us to combine the two in verifying the conformity of the first with the second.
212
The arbitrator relied both on the principle of the binding force of contracts recognized by Libyan law and on the principle pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), which is essential to international law. 213 The United Nations Charter recognizes the importance of the principle of good faith. 214 described as the prohibition of malicious injury, that is, the exercise of a right-or supposed right-for the sole purpose of causing injury to another. 216 The principle of good faith establishes interdependence between the rights of an investor and its obligations. A bona fide exercise of a right is expected rather than an exercise aimed at procuring an unfair advantage. 217 The exercise of a right in a manner which prejudices the interests of the other party (the State) would constitute a breach of the principle. 218 International arbitration tribunals have developed increasingly specialized general principles of law in their case law. 219 The general principle of good faith gives rise to more specific obligations such as good faith in the conclusion, interpretation, and performance of contracts. 220 An even more specific principle would be interpretation against a party that unilaterally drafted a contract. 221 Other examples of general principles of law applied by investor-state tribunals include restitutio in integrum 222 and an injured person's duty to mitigate damages. 223 Tribunals have also applied principles of pacta sunt servanda, 224 estoppel, binding precedent. 233 Many investor-state tribunals, however, found themselves not barred, as a matter of principle, from considering the position taken or the opinion expressed by other tribunals. In addition to case law, investor-state tribunals often rely on scholarly writings to help establish norms of law. 236 Therefore, international jurisprudence and scholarly writings can be used as subsidiary means of identifying investor obligations in investor-state disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The growing number of counterclaims submitted by States goes hand in hand with the growing number of investor-state disputes. The 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which broadened jurisdiction of UNCITRAL tribunals, will further increase the number of State counterclaims. Correct understanding of the mechanism of investor consent to counterclaims and correct identification of investor obligations will make the system of investor-state dispute resolution more efficient and fair.
Investor consent to counterclaims is essential. The relevant treaty dispute resolution clause affects jurisdiction of investorstate tribunals. If the treaty contains an offer of jurisdiction only in relation to disputes arising out of State obligations, it may be difficult for the tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over counterclaims unless the parties subsequently alter this offer by an explicit or implicit agreement.
Identification of investor obligations is crucial to determining the substantive content of the procedural right to counterclaim. Although investment treaties usually do not provide for investor obligations, such obligations can be found in other sources of law.
Counterclaims cannot be based on domestic law obligations of investors unless such obligations were specifically mentioned in the relevant investment treaty or otherwise violate the parties' preexisting international law commitments. Otherwise, violation of purely domestic law obligations is insufficient for an investor-state tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over counterclaims.
In the absence of concrete provisions setting out investor obligations in international treaties, general principles of law appear to be an appropriate source of international law to determine such obligations.
Contractual obligations of investors fall outside of the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals with one exception. The State may assert counterclaims if the investor breached its obligations under the investment contract concluded with the State provided that the relevant investment treaty or an arbitration agreement contains a sufficiently broad dispute resolution clause.
